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Abstract
Radical communist reforms propelled traditionally secluded Han Chinese
women into the labor force but exempted ethnic minorities. Using an eco-
nomic experiment, this study compares the gender gap in competitive inclina-
tion across three ethnic groups in one county. The Han Chinese have no statis-
tically significant gender gap while the patrilineal Yi women are significantly
less competitively inclined than Yi men and than Han Chinese women. The
matrilineal Mosuo women are as competitively inclined as the Han Chinese
women. The findings affirm that culture matters for competitive inclination
and suggests the hypothesis that institutional changes can narrow the gender
gap in competitive inclination.
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Women have made significant strides in educational achievement (Goldin et al.,
2006), yet they continue to be underrepresented in positions of power and earn less
than 80 cents to every dollar earned by men.1 The leading explanations for these
gender differences in labor market outcomes are discrimination and gender dif-
ferences in preferences (e.g., Bertrand (2011); Altonji & Blank (1999); Goldin &
Rouse (2000); Black & Strahan (2001)). In particular, recent experimental evidence
on competitive preferences suggests that women are reluctant to enter competitions,
which could translate into an unwillingness to apply for competitive jobs or to seek
promotions. When given a choice between a tournament payment scheme and a
piece-rate payment scheme, men are much more likely to choose the former, de-
spite performing no better than women did in the experimental tasks (e.g., Niederle
& Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2008; Sutter & Rützler, 2010; Healy & Pate,
2011; Dargnies, 2011; Booth & Nolen, 2012).2 Zhang (2012) finds that experi-
mental measures of competitive inclination subsequently predicts the rate of taking
a highly competitive school entrance exam, even after accounting for traditional
explanations.
These findings imply that even when women have the same choices as men and
are equally capable, they will be less likely to compete for the opportunities that
can maximize their productive capacity, which has potentially enormous efficiency
consequences. The goal of this paper is to examine the determinants of the gender
gap in competitive inclination. Specifically, I test whether it is influenced by culture.
Since Akerlof & Kranton (2000), economists have increasingly taken note of
the impact of gender norms on a variety of labor market outcomes (e.g., Fernan-
dez et al., 2004; Fortin, 2005; Fernandez & Fogli, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013). An
1Bertrand & Hallock (2001) find that between 1992 and 1997, of the top 5 highest paid execu-
tives in a large set of US public corporations, 2.5% were women; Wolfers (2006) finds that between
1992 and 2004, women occupied the position of CEO of the S&P 1500 companies 1.3% of the time.
The UN reports that in 2012, 18% of parliamentarians worldwide are women, including seats re-
served specifically for female politicians (United Nations, 2012). In developing regions, this figure
is 15%. Gender earnings gap data come from Blau et al. (2010).
2An earlier strand of the literature finds that males also perform better than females under com-
petitive situations relative to non-competitive situations (Gneezy et al. 2003; Gneezy & Rustichini,
2004; Paserman, 2010).
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earlier body of literature in psychology offers suggestive evidence that gender-role
socialization leads to gender differences in psychological attributes, such as the
motivation to achieve (Horner, 1972). Fitzgerald & Betz (1983) states: “... cul-
turally based sex-role socialization operates from early childhood to prepare young
girls for the roles of wife and mother and to encourage in them the development
of personality characteristics and behavioral competencies that will facilitate the
performance of those roles (emphasis added).”3
It is also possible that young men and women choose different behavioral pat-
terns in preparation for their anticipated adult roles.4 Because they expect to be-
come breadwinners who must compete for resources, young men may develop a
taste for competitive games. Young women, who see themselves possibly becom-
ing homemakers or otherwise do not expect to work full-time for pay, may consider
competitiveness less useful. Just as cultural norms prescribing lower labor force
participation for women may have influenced women to underinvest in labor mar-
ket skills (Goldin, 1990:156; Sandell & Shapiro, 1980), they may lead men and
women to form potentially inefficient attitudes toward competition.
Regardless of the mechanism, if the gender gap in competitive inclination is due
to culture, then it may vary across cultures and may change over time, as culture
evolves. On the other hand, the gender differences could be innate. Evolutionary
biology theory links gender differences in competitive inclination to gender dif-
ferences in reproductive strategy. While male reproductive success is rewarded by
competition for mating opportunities (which often entails competition for resources
that are attractive to females), female reproductive success is rewarded by investing
in the offspring they have, because physiologically, they invest heavily in repro-
duction and are limited in the number of offspring they can produce in a lifetime
(Trivers, 1972). In economic parlance, the marginal benefit (to reproductive suc-
cess) from competing is higher for men than for women. This effect would be
3In the psychology literature, gender role socialization is thought to occur through three main
channels: reinforcement by parents of gender appropriate behavior, children modeling their behavior
on same sex parents, and children learning the rules of appropriate behavior from observing adults
in a society (e.g., Williams, 1977; Hyde & Rosenberg, 1980).
4According to the American Time Use Survey, wives spent twice as much time on housework
as husbands did in 2006 and teenage girls spent 50% more time doing housework than teenage boys
in 2003 (Blau et al., 2010: 51-53).
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magnified in polygamous and otherwise non-monogamous societies.
In a pioneering study, Gneezy et al. (2009) shows that among the patrilineal
Maasai in Tanzania, men are more competitively inclined than women, whereas in
a matrilineal society in India, where men take on a large role in childcare, the gen-
der gap is reversed. This important result was the first to establish that the gender
gap in competitive inclination is not universal across all cultures, and suggests that
gender norms may influence the gender gap in competitive inclination. A subse-
quent study comparing Swedish and Colombian children, however, finds no gender
gap in competitive inclination for Colombian children, whereas Swedish boys were
more competitively inclined than Swedish girls on certain tasks, despite Sweden
scoring higher than Colombia on gender equality indices (Cárdenas et al., 2012).
The challenge to attributing the variation in gender gaps in competitive inclina-
tion (or in any other domain) across different countries and regions to culture is that
a number of other factors may also be at play. For example, gender inequality tends
to be larger among lower income countries and to decrease as countries develop
(Duflo, 2011). Factors that may influence economic growth (e.g., macroeconomic
policy (Fischer, 1993), trade openness (Sachs & Warner, 1995), geography and cli-
mate (Diamond, 1997)), then, could potentially help explain variation in the gender
gap in competitive inclination around the world. One could take the extreme po-
sition that all such variation can be attributed to cross-country and cross-regional
differences, rather than to cultural differences.
To address this challenge, this study tests for variation in the gender gap in com-
petitive inclination across cultures in one county of southwest China, approximately
one-third the size of the San Francisco Bay Area, using the now standard Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) competition game.5 To further encourage homogeneity of
the subjects in all respects except culture, subjects were drawn from the 11th and
12th grade student body in one high school. The geographical concentration has the
added advantage of side-stepping four important methodological difficulties com-
mon in cross-cultural experimental studies, as detailed in Camerer (2003): First,
5Gong & Yang (2012) studied risk attitudes among the patrilineal Yi and the matrilineal Mosuo
in the same county. Flory et al. (2011) also take advantage of within-country cultural diversity to
study competitive inclination in matrilineal and patrilineal societies in 12 villages in Malawi.
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experimental payouts do not require adjustment for purchasing power as they would
across different countries. Second, instructions do not need to be translated across
cultures because the language of instruction is uniformly Mandarin Chinese. Third,
all experiments could be and were conducted by one experimenter (the author),
which minimizes experimenter variation. Fourth, any background variables that
differ across individuals can be directly controlled for, without having to translate,
say, the level of educational attainment in one culture into its equivalent in another.
Three ethnic groups are studied: the Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in
China, the Yi, a patrilineal ethnic group, and the Mosuo, a matrilineal and func-
tionally polygamous ethnic group. Traditional Han Chinese society is a patrilineal
society similar to Yi society, in which women had little economic independence
and were largely confined to the domestic arena. Genetic distance-wise, the two
groups are closer than the French and the Russians (see Section 2). The communist
reforms that began in the 1950s, discussed in more detail in Section 3, shocked then
prevailing social norms by propelling women into the paid labor force through la-
bor collectivization and legislative reforms. By 1980, labor force participation for
women aged 15 and above was 71% (compared with 51% in the United States).6
These reforms exempted ethnic minorities to a large extent out of concerns for po-
litical stability, a fact which will be exploited to aid in the interpretation of the
results.
I find no statistically significant gender gap in competitive inclination (defined
as the residual gender gap in entry into the experimental competition after account-
ing for the probability of wining, overconfidence, and risk aversion) among the
Han Chinese experimental participants. This is striking, in light of the 20 to 50 per-
centage point gender gaps documented in Western societies using almost identical
measurements. The patrilineal Yi have a statistically significant gender gap of 24
percentage points, with the women less competitively inclined than the men and
than the Han Chinese. The Yi men are equally competitively inclined as the Han
Chinese. Women from the matrilineal Mosuo are also equally competitively in-
clined as the Han Chinese, but Mosuo men are statistically significantly more com-
6Data from ILO. Data are not disaggregated by ethnic group, but over 90% of Chinese were
Han Chinese in 1980.
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petitively inclined than Mosuo women, contrary to prior findings from matrilineal
societies, and possibly due to polygamy. The results affirm the impact of culture
on competitive inclination, and the Han Chinese-Yi comparison further suggests
the hypothesis that “fast-moving” institutional changes may alter the gender gap in
competitive inclination.7
The paper proceeds in Section 2 to discuss the ethnic background of the groups
studied. Section 3 describes the communist reforms and the exemptions for mi-
nority ethnic groups. Section 4 presents descriptive data on subject characteristics.
Section 5 describes the experimental data collection procedures. Section 6 exam-
ines the determinants of entry into the lab competition for each ethnic group and
defines competitive inclination. Section 7 presents results pooling all three eth-
nic groups. Sections 8 and 9 check the interpretations of the results and examine
alternative explanations. Section 10 concludes.
2 Ethnic background
The experiments were conducted in Ninglang, a mountainous county located in the
border province of Yunnan, which is home to 25 ethnic minority groups.8 Ninglang
has been on the register of “poor” counties since the criteria for the designation
were first established in 1986.9 In 2008, GDP per capita was $630 (China County
Statistics, 2008).10
With a population of 230,000, Ninglang’s three main ethnic groups are the Yi,
the Han Chinese, and the Mosuo, comprising 62%, 20%, and 9% of the population,
7The term “fast-moving” institutions (such as the legal or political system), in contrast to “slow-
moving institutions (such as culture), is borrowed from Roland (2004). This paper departs slightly
from Roland’s approach in allowing for the possibility of “fast-moving” institutions to influence
preferences.
8In the 1950s, the Chinese government sponsored a massive ethnic identification project, which
officially categorized each citizen into one of 56 ethnic groups. Today, ethnic identity can only be
transmitted from parent to child (and in rare cases grandparent to grandchild).
9The basic standard for qualifying as a “poor” county was rural net income per capita below
RMB150 in 1985 (around $50 using 1985 exchange rates). Currently 28% of counties in China (the
term “county” is reserved for rural regions) are designated poor. See (Park et al., 2002) for details
on the determinants of poor county designation.
10Based on the exchange rate at the time of $1 = RMB 6.8.
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respectively (China Population Census, 2000). Ethnic classification is based on offi-
cial government designations, and was obtained from school administrative records
and confirmed with subjects’ self-reports. Such information is not considered sen-
sitive in any way and can also be found on an individual’s national identification
card and in other official records. The three main ethnic groups in Ninglang have
had a long history of coexistence in the region prior to the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in 1949. For a more detailed discussion of the history of
settlement, see Appendix A.
According to data from the Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel, which
contains 53 ethnic groups, the genetic distance between the Yi and the Han Chinese
is greater than that between the French and the Italians, but is smaller than the
distance between the Russians and either the French or the Italians (Ashraf & Galor,
2013).11 No data are available for the Mosuo, but data for the Naxi, an ethnic group
related to the Mosuo, show that the genetic distance between either the Han and the
Naxi or between the Yi and the Naxi is about twice as high as the distance between
the Yi and the Han Chinese, comparable to the distance between the French and the
Palestinians.12
2.1 Women in Traditional Han Chinese and Yi culture
In the traditional Han Chinese and Yi societies, women had low status and little
autonomy. They were subordinate to men at every stage of their lives: to their
fathers and brothers before they marry, to their husbands during marriage, and to
their sons should they become widows (e.g., Croll, 1980: 13; Ma, 1995: 18). A
woman’s marriage was arranged in the interest of the family by the head of the
household or clan, almost always male (Stacey, 1983: 34; Harrell, 2001: 91) and
often when she is still a young girl (Croll, 1980: 26; Wu, 1997: 207). Once married,
a woman belonged to her husband’s family (e.g., Stacey, 1983: 34; Bamo, 2001).
As in other patrilineal cultures, this meant that she lost her kinship associations and
11Data downloaded from http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.1
12The Mosuo in Ninglang are actually classified as belonging to the Naxi ethnicity, but have
been given state recognition as a “people,” (Harrell, 2001, p. 70) and have been issued official
documentation identifying them as such.
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rights to the property of her natal family (Harrell, 2002). The transient nature of a
daughter’s membership in her natal family is reflected in traditional proverbs. For
example, the Han Chinese have a saying, “A boy is born facing in and a girl is born
facing out (Croll, 1980: 23),” and the Yi, “An egg is both meat and not meat; a
daughter is both family member and not (Bamo, 2001).”
Producing children is of paramount importance to a woman’s status in a house-
hold. In both traditional Han Chinese and Yi cultures, not producing children, es-
pecially a son, can be grounds for divorcing a woman (Croll, 1980: 28; Feng, 1995:
166). A divorced woman is extremely vulnerable as she has no claims on her hus-
band’s family’s property or land, and any land and property in her natal home would
have already been divvied up between her brothers (Croll, 1980: 33).
Women’s activities were confined to the domestic arena in both traditional Han
Chinese and Yi societies (Croll, 1980: Ch 2; Stacey, 1983: 39; Dong, 1985: 168).
They were denied the opportunity for education, since any investment in a daughter
would eventually be lost to another household, and because educated women were
thought to be less obedient (Croll, 1980: 26; Feng, 1995: 178-179). They were de-
nied participation in community institutions and other public affairs (Croll, 1980:
15; Ma, 1995: 18). While they may generate income for the household through do-
mestic sidelines and occasional agricultural work or be charged with safeguarding
the household cash and grains, they did so only with the permission of the men and
could not spend money without male sanction (Croll, 1980: 21; Yang, 1965: 140;
Ma, 1995: 18). In one respect the Han Chinese women were even more secluded
than their Yi counterparts: they were physically confined to their immediate sur-
roundings by the practice of foot-binding, a practice from which the Yi and other
minority women were spared (Croll, 1980: 18-20; Harrell, 2001: 99).
2.2 Women in Traditional Mosuo culture
In Mosuo society, kinship ties are traced through the maternal line (e.g., Cai, 2001;
Shih, 1993). Mosuo women enjoy considerably more status and autonomy than
women in the traditional patrilineal Han Chinese or Yi societies. At birth, a Mosuo
child automatically becomes a member of his or her mother’s family. Brothers and
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sisters generally work, eat, and raise the children born to the sisters together (Cai,
2001: 121). In each household, there are generally two household heads, one male
and one female (Cai, 2001: 122-123) and authority stems from the personal merits
of competence and impartiality (Cai, 2001: 124). Each member of the household
has the right to enjoy the fruits of his or her own labor, unlike in traditional Han
Chinese and Yi households, where income was controlled by the household head.
For all important decisions such as those related to farming technology, land sales,
or construction, all members of the household would be included in the discussions
(Cai, 2001: 125).
A unique feature of the Mosuo matrilineal society is their sexual visitation sys-
tem called the “walking marriage,” whereby a man visits a woman in the evenings
but returns to his own matrilineal home by the next morning. It normally does not
involve cohabitation and is “nonexclusive, noncontractual, and nonobligatory (Shih,
1993).” A Mosuo man or woman is free to engage in a “walking marriage” with no
explicit limitation related to “age, generation, rank, or ethnic identity (Shih, 2010:
77).” There is also no “moral, legal, economic, or other conditions” that prevent ei-
ther partner from being involved in multiple “walking marriages” at the same time
(Shih, 2010: 81; Cai, 2001: 202) or to terminate a relationship at will (Shih, 2010:
79). Children resulting from “walking marriages” usually grow up in their mother’s
household, with the maternal uncle playing the closest role to a father figure (Shih,
1993). In addition to matriliny, then, Mosuo society differs from the Yi and Han
Chinese societies in that it is not a monogamous society.
3 Communist reforms
When the Communist government assumed power in China in 1949, one of the
first orders of business was to mobilize labor, in particular, women’s labor, for the
purpose of rapid industrialization and infrastructure development (Wolf, 1985: 81;
Yang, 1965). To this end, it was necessary to weaken the social and economic
importance of the traditional Chinese family, which had long been the “dominant
organizational unit of production (Yang, 1965: 154-155).” To reach these policy
objectives, the Marriage Law of 1950 was enacted and promulgated, which explic-
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itly granted wives the freedom to participate in productive labor (Yang, 1965: 145).
More indirectly, the Marriage Law abolished arranged marriage, established statu-
tory minimum ages for marriage, and granted both husbands and wives the right
to divorce, which increased women’s autonomy in the household, weakened the
claims of the household head on women’s labor, and thus freed women to work
for pay outside of the home (Hershatter, 2004: 999).13 The radical legislation was
accompanied by the establishment of local courts to which women could and did
turn to defy the authority of the household head and mass education campaigns to
make the new legal provisions known throughout the country (Croll, 1983: 1-2).14
Supporting the legislation was propaganda stressing that women’s participation
in collective labor was the “only road to emancipation from man’s domination and
family oppression (Yang, 1965: 154).” For example, the state-run media publicized
stories of mistreated wives who gained respect from their in-laws by bringing home
income from their work on the cooperative farms (Yang, 1965: 154). Men, for their
part, were re-educated in widespread campaigns exhorting them to undertake their
share of domestic chores (Croll, 1983: 7).
Collectivization of industry and agriculture further propelled women into the
paid labor force. In urban areas, they worked in state enterprises and neighborhood
workers’ cooperatives. In rural areas, they worked in agricultural collectives, in
which they, like the men, were paid individually in workpoints that translated into
grains and cash (e.g., Yang, 1965: 162; Croll, 1983). 15,16 These effects have been
13The right for a wife to keep her maiden name after marriage was another provision introduced
in the Marriage Law, a custom which differentiates the Han Chinese of the People’s Republic of
China from those Han Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan today.
14See Yang (1965): Ch 4 for examples of court cases in which women sued successfully for
custody, financial support, and property upon divorce.
15While there remains a debate around just how much more valuable was women’s work in the
collective era compared with their contribution to their households pre-1949 (Benjamin & Brandt,
1995; Kung & Lee, 2010), it is undisputed that collectivization transformed agricultural work into
paid work outside of the home, giving unprecedented visibility to women’s contribution to house-
hold income and presumably control over that income (Yang, 1965: 162; Croll, 1983).
16This is not to say that women and men were compensated equally for their work. On average
women received 6.5 to 7 workpoints per day to a man’s 10 (Wolf, 1985: 88), which, incidentally,
was similar to the gender wage gap in the United States at the time (see, for example, Goldin (1990)).
However, given the relative transparency of the workpoint system, women were sometimes able to
successfully contest blatantly unfair cases by demanding a direct comparison of their productivity
against the men’s (Wolf, 1985: 97).
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long-lasting. In 1980, long after the labor force was decollectivized, labor force
participation for women aged 15 and over was 71%, which was higher than that
in every OECD country at the time, and was higher even than male labor force
participation in some, e.g., Italy and the Netherlands (ILO, 1980). The transition
to a market economy has further reduced female labor force participation in China,
but it remains higher that in all OECD countries except Iceland (ILO, 2010).17
Because agricultural work in rural China today is once again mainly unpaid work
on the family plot, women’s relative labor force participation in the non-agricultural
sector is perhaps more telling. According to the 2000 Population Census, for those
aged 15 and over, the relative proportion of the female labor force employed in the
non-agricultural sector compared to the male proportion is 79% (China Population
Census, 2000, 0.095% micro sample).18
3.1 Exemptions for minorities
In an exchange of cultural autonomy for regional stability, the Chinese government
exempted the 55 officially recognized minority groups, who tended to live along the
borderlands, from important aspects of the communist reforms (Mackerras, 1994:
145). The land reform that was completed by 1953 in most of China did not begin
in Ninglang until 1956 (Guo, 2008: 229 ) and unlike the Han Chinese landlords,
the Yi elites were allowed to keep some of their political rights (Guo, 2008: 230).
The traditional power structure in the family was also left relatively intact in
ethnic minority societies. The national Marriage Law of 1950 allowed the local
governments in minority regions to adapt the law as necessary and exempted some
minority ethnic groups from the statutory minimum marriage age and from the
divorce policies (Dreyer, 1976: 119; Guo, 2008: 78). Furthermore, implementation
of marriage reforms among the minority ethnic groups was “halted from the start
(Guo, 2008: 78).” For the Yi, it meant that a majority continued to follow customary
17In 2010, labor force participation of women aged 15 and over was 67.9% in China and 70.4%
in Iceland. The next highest figure from an OECD country is 61.8%, in Canada.
18Calculated as (number of women employed in the non-agricultural sector)/(number of women employed+unemployed)(number of men employed in the non-agricultural sector)/(number of men employed+unemployed)
for those aged 15 and over, where the non-agricultural sector is defined as all industries exclud-
ing the census category of ’farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery’.
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clan laws regarding marriage.
A marriage law for Ninglang was not enacted until 1981, 30 years after the
National Marriage Law. It was less strict than the National Marriage Law toward
practices such as child betrothal and early marriage (Wu, 1997: 206, 209), and
stipulated a lower statutory minimum marriage age (Wu, 1997: 204; Guo, 2008:
78). The education campaign for the Ninglang marriage law did not begin until
1986, and was hampered by high illiteracy rates (Wu, 1997: 202).
Surveys conducted in a neighboring prefecture, predominantly Yi, confirm that
traditional Yi marriage customs have endured. From 1984-1987, the Women’s Fed-
eration conducted a survey of 99,792 couples and found that 72% had arranged
marriages (Yuan, 1992: 119). In the same research project, the Women’s Federa-
tion surveyed 88,615 minors, which found that 40% of those aged 7-14 were be-
trothed and 74% of those aged 15-17 were either married or betrothed (Yuan, 1992:
120). According to the 1990 Population Census, nationally, 13.5% of Yi females
aged 15-19 were married, while the comparable figure for Han Chinese females was
4.3% (Zhang & Chen, 1995). Where Yi marriage reforms met with any success was
among salaried state employees (Wu, 1997: 202; Yuan, 1992: 128).
The Mosuo, whose traditional household labor organization already resembled
that of a communist production team and whose traditional culture was character-
ized by the freedom to choose one’s romantic partners, were not greatly affected
by collectivization or the marriage reforms, even without the minority exemptions
(Guo, 2008: 92, 141).19 The state did, however, require salaried employees of the
state to obtain marriage certificates (Cai, 2001: 403).
If child bearing and child rearing responsibilities that come with marriage limit
women’s access to skilled work, early marriage among Yi women potentially results
in low labor force participation in the non-agricultural sector.20 The regulation
19While there were no formal legislative sanctions on the traditional Mosuo marriage institu-
tion, during the Cultural Revolution, with pressure from a Communist party work team, the local
commune leaders tried to impose monogamous marriage on those involved in open relationships.
However, once the work team left, with the exception of marriages involving cadres, most marriages
dissolved shortly thereafter (Cai, 2001: 389). With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the onset
of the market reforms, the policy was reversed and Ninglang County officially recognized the Mosuo
visiting relationship as legitimate in 1981 (Shih, 1993).
20While almost all working age people in Ninglang work, the vast majority of workers are in
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prohibiting married persons from enrolling in higher education likely compounds
the effect.21 According to the 2000 China Population Census, in Ninglang County,
the relative proportion of the Yi female labor force employed in the non-agricultural
sector compared to the Yi male proportion is 37% (see Table 1).22 The same statistic
is 73% for the Han Chinese and 84% for the Mosuo.
Interestingly, the Yi scholar Stevan Harrell notes that pre-reform ethnologists
“always compared the position of [Yi] women favorably to that of their foot- and
house- bound Han counterparts (Harrell, 2001: 99).” However, Yi women today
appear to have lower relative status than Han Chinese women, being less likely
to participate in the public sphere and less likely to be educated. Yi women did
not become cadres or teachers as Han Chinese women and women of other ethnic
minority groups did. And in everyday interaction, the Yi women serve the men, eat
after them, and do most of the housework while men “sit, talk and drink (Harrell,
2001: 99).”
4 Descriptive statistics
A short written survey was administered to the subjects after each experimental ses-
sion to capture socioeconomic and demographic background characteristics. The
questions were written to correspond to the 2000 China Population Census when-
ever possible to maximize clarity.23 Selected survey results are presented in panel
A of Table 1.24 All three ethnic groups have similar levels of household income,
the agricultural sector. They are mainly unskilled workers working on the land allocated to their
family by the government. In contrast, non-agricultural jobs, such as teaching and working for gov-
ernment bureaus, are highly selective, often requiring prospective applicants to pass a competitive
employment exam.
21The ban on marriage for college students was lifted by the Ministry of Education in 2005.
22Calculated as (number of Yi women employed in the non-agricultural sector)/(number of Yi women employed+ unemployed)(number of Yi men employed in the non-agricultural sector)/(number of Yi men employed+ unemployed) ,
using tables T90.L0201 and T90.L0203 for Ninglang county, where the non-agricultural sector is
defined as all industries excluding the census category of ’farming, forestry, animal husbandry and
fishery’.
23Nonetheless, verbal clarifications were required for some of the questions, such as the defini-
tion of siblings in a household, since often cousins living together under the same roof are referred
to as brothers and sisters colloquially.
24For the complete survey instrument, see the web appendix at ihome.ust.hk/~janezhang/.
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educational attainment of household heads, propensity to have a head of household
working in the non-agricultural sector, and number of siblings. There is no age dif-
ference across the ethnic groups since, by design, the subjects were drawn in equal
numbers from grades 11 and 12. The ethnic correlates correspond to the ethno-
graphic evidence, with the Mosuo most likely to have a female head of household
and to have parents participating in a walking marriage. Given the lack of rules and
obligations surrounding the Mosuo union, it is not surprising to find that the Mosuo
also have the highest propensity for mixed ethnicity relationships.25
The top section of panel B presents high school administrative data. The sub-
jects scored about equally well in the most recent standardized county-wide math
exam. There is no significant gender difference in the math scores, consistent with
other findings from China (Lai, 2010).
5 Data collection
5.1 Experimental subjects and procedures
The experiments were conducted in one of the only two high schools in Ninglang
county. Students of all ethnic backgrounds attend the same classes and live in the
same dormitories, as is typical of ethnically diverse schools in China.26 Subjects
were students in grades 11 and 12, recruited randomly from the school’s roster by
ethnicity, gender, and grade such that each session consisted of one ethnic group in
one grade, evenly divided across gender. The data consist of 96 Han, 96 Yi, and 80
Mosuo subjects. The smaller number of Mosuo subjects is a consequence of their
small population size.27
All sessions were conducted in the fall semester of 2009. Session sizes ranged
from 20 to 24 subjects, with a total of 12 sessions. To ensure that any results ob-
25The gender differences in competitive inclination among the mixed ethnicity and the non-mixed
ethnicity Mosuo subjects are substantively identical (regression results available upon request).
26Schools in this county, as elsewhere in China, follow a uniform standard for textbooks, cur-
riculum, and exams. Students generally live in school dormitories, although students whose homes
are nearby may choose to commute.
27Mosuo students make up 8.3% of the high school population, almost identical to their popula-
tion representation.
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tained are not sensitive to the smaller number of Mosuo subjects, two extra sessions
with 12 Mosuo subjects each were conducted in the other high school in Ninglang
county.28 All results are substantively identical when the combined 14 sessions of
data from the two high schools are used. Appendix C contains reproductions of all
the tables and figures in the paper using data from the 14 sessions.
Selected students were informed during class of the time and place to meet for
the experiment. Absentees were replaced by the first students on the randomized
roster that matched on ethnicity, gender, and grade, and consisted of no more than
5% of the total subjects present. Vacant classrooms generally designated for taking
exams were used as the experimental lab. All sessions took place during the school
day, either during normal breaks, or during times that administrators deemed ap-
propriate. Each session lasted around an hour, a time limit which was imposed by
the school administrators.
In each session, all experimental instructions were read out loud by the author
in Mandarin, which is the national language as well as the official language of
instruction. Copies of the instructions were also distributed to everyone. Subjects
recorded their responses on paper and graders assessed these responses during each
session. Scratch paper was provided for everyone.
5.2 Experimental design
The experiment was borrowed from Niederle & Vesterlund (2007). The task used
throughout the experiment was to add sets of five two-digit numbers and to do as
many as possible in five minutes.29 The number of problems correctly solved is the
subject’s “score” in the subsequent discussion. The experiment consists of three
rounds, throughout which subjects were randomly seated in groups of four (two
males and two females) and were not allowed communication although they could
see one another.
28Both high schools are located in the county seat, within a mile of each other. Selectivity of the
two high schools is comparable - according to a school administrator, in the enrollment process, the
two schools each take turns admitting students according to their rank on the high school entrance
exam, until that school’s quota is reached.
29For the experimental instructions, see the web appendix at ihome.ust.hk/~janezhang/.
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Round 1: Piece-rate - subjects are compensated RMB 0.5 for each problem
solved.30
Round 2: Compulsory tournament - The subject who solves the most problems
in his or her group of 4 receives RMB 2 for each correctly solved problem, while
the others receive no payment.31
Round 3: Discretionary tournament - subjects first choose which of the two
types of compensation schemes (piece-rate or tournament) they would like to apply
to their performance in this round. If they choose piece-rate, they are paid RMB 0.5
per problem solved. If they choose to enter their performance in a tournament, they
receive RMB 2 per problem if they score highest in their group of four, and nothing
if there is someone in their group who scores higher than they do.
Following Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), if the subject chooses tournament in
round 3, their score is compared to the scores of the other three group members
in round 2 (the compulsory tournament round), rather than their score in round
3. This ensures that participants choosing the tournament option are competing
against the scores of others also performing under the tournament incentives, and
rules out reasons for not choosing the tournament such as not wanting to impose
negative externalities on others or strategic response to beliefs about other partici-
pants’ choices.
Subjects receive their scores from the previous round before they begin the next
round. However, they do not know their relative ranking within their group. After
the third round, subjects are asked to guess their rank in the compulsory tournament.
This information will be used in the analysis to assess the accuracy of their beliefs
toward their relative performance. The order in which the piece-rate round and the
compulsory tournament round was conducted was randomized across sessions of
each ethnicity such that half of the sessions for each ethnic group were conducted
with the piece-rate round occurring first and the rest with the compulsory tourna-
ment round occurring first. The discretionary tournament round always occurred
last.
Following standard experimental practice, one unpaid practice round was ad-
30As a point of reference, lunch in the school cafeterias costs RMB 3.5.
31In the case of a tie all those tied for highest score are paid RMB 2 per problem.
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ministered before the first round to familiarize subjects with the task. At the end
of the experiment, one of the rounds was randomly chosen for payout, to minimize
wealth effects across the rounds. The written survey was distributed as students
waited for their payment. The show up fee was RMB 2 and average payout not
including the show up fee was RMB 7.5.
6 Tournament entry and competitive inclination
In order to isolate gender differences in competitive inclination from other factors
influencing a subject’s tournament entry decision, I follow the literature in control-
ling for each individual subject’s probability of winning the tournament, overcon-
fidence, and risk aversion using the following empirical model, which can also be
derived from a structural model based on constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences (see Zhang (2012)):
yi = α0 +α1malei+δ pi+ τγi+λqi+ εi (1)
where yi = 1 if the subject chooses tournament and 0 if the subject chooses
piece-rate. malei = 1 if the subject is male and zero if the subject is female. The
regressors pi, the probability of winning the tournament, γi, the CRRA coefficient,
and qi, the measure of overconfidence, are defined below.
6.1 Probability of winning the tournament
The decision of entering a tournament involves an assessment of the probability of
winning against the risk of losing.32 Typically, experimental subjects are drawn
from large universities and are virtually anonymous to each other. Assuming no
expected increases in computational ability from the compulsory tournament round
to the discretionary tournament round, the objective probability of winning pi can
be fully proxied by one’s own realized score on the compulsory tournament sri. In
the current setting, subjects are known to each other, and, moreover, their ability
32The gap between a subject’s objective probability of winning and his or her subjective proba-
bility of winning will be addressed in the section on overconfidence.
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in math is known to each other, given that grades are public knowledge in China.
Therefore, a more precise proxy for the objective probability of winning would
take into account not only one’s own scores, but the scores of one’s competitors as
well. To summarize the four scores into one measure, I employ a standard logit
probability equation. Assume that the potential score spi is known up to some noise
around the realized score sri:
spi = sri+ kηi (2)
where ηi is an i.i.d. extreme value type I noise term, and k is inversely propor-
tional to the standard deviation of the noise. Then the closed-form expression for
pi, the true probability of winning in a group g is:
pi = Pr(spi > sp j, j 6= i) = exp(ksri)∑ j∈g exp(ksr j)
(3)
Since winning in the discretionary tournament is defined as scoring higher than the
other three group members did in the compulsory tournament round, sri denotes
the score in the discretionary tournament round and sr j, j 6= i, denotes the scores in
the compulsory tournament round. k, the non-linear scale parameter was estimated
separately in Zhang (2012).
Panel A in figure 1 shows the empirical cdfs of performance in the compulsory
tournament round by gender for each ethnic group. Mann-Whitney tests find no
significant gender differences for the Yi and the Mosuo (p-values=0.73 and 0.85,
respectively) and marginally higher scores for the Han Chinese men (p-value=0.13).
The literature typically finds no significant gender differences in performance on
this task (e.g., Niederle & Vesterlund (2007)).
Panel B in figure 1 shows distributions of the probabilities of winning the tour-
nament, calculated using Equation 3. The overlap by gender is substantial, and
Mann-Whitney tests reveal no significant gender differences (all p-values > 0.10).
This is consistent with the above analysis of performance on the tasks.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation 1, using a probit model and
clustering standard errors by session. Column 1 in each panel includes no controls
19
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and thus tests for gender differences in raw tournament entry rates. Substantial gen-
der differences exist for the Yi and the Mosuo, with the men more likely to choose
the tournament by 23 and 28 percentage points, respectively. The Han Chinese have
a somewhat smaller gender difference of 15 percentage points. The gender differ-
ences in raw entry rates are smaller than that found in Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), and are similar in size to that found in Gneezy et al. (2009), also conducted
in developing regions (See Appendix Table A.2).33
Column 2 of each of the three panels in Table 2 controls for the probability
of winning. The coefficients on male remains largely unchanged from Column 1,
although they are now slightly smaller for the Han Chinese and the Mosuo.
Because the tournament entry decision depends not only on the probability of
winning the tournament, but also on the potential payout if piece-rate is chosen, an-
other piece of information that is relevant for subjects is the effect that the tourna-
ment incentive has on their performance itself. In the literature this effect has been
measured by the improvement in scores between the piece-rate and compulsory
tournament rounds (Gneezy et al., 2003). In order to isolate the effect of the tour-
nament incentive from learning between Round 1 and Round 2, the current study
departed from the standard Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) design in randomizing
the order of the piece-rate and tournament rounds. Thus, the improvement between
the piece-rate round and the tournament round indicates the degree to which perfor-
mances respond to tournament incentives, net of any learning effects. In essence the
first two rounds replicate the design of Gneezy et al. (2003).34 Comparisons across
33Zhang (2012) studied competitive inclination in students from two middle schools in Ninglang
county and found no gender differences among subjects of the three ethnic groups. While age is
an obvious difference between the subjects in the current study and in Zhang (2012), middle school
students and high school students are also selected differently, which prevents a direct comparison
of the results from identifying age effects. While middle school is compulsory, only around 30%
of middle school students are accepted into high school. Furthermore, whereas high schools draw
from all middle schools in the county, the two middle schools in Zhang (2012) are not representative
of the county’s middle schools. The first middle school was selected because of its high proportion
of Mosuo students, and the other was selected because of its high proportion of Yi students and its
proximity to the first.
34More precisely, the performance in the first chronological round is equivalent to performances
of subjects who only participated under one incentive scheme, as was the case in Gneezy et al.
(2003). Results from an analysis of the first round alone (not reported) are consistent with results
from analyzing the combined first two rounds.
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gender and ethnic group show no gender or ethnic differences in performance im-
provement from piece-rate to tournament and, in fact, there are no improvements
in performance on average (see Figure 2). This is consistent with other studies that
use a short task (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011) and could also result from the envi-
ronment of test-taking priming students to perform to the extent of their ability on
each task.
6.2 Overconfidence
The decision to enter the tournament may reflect both an objective and a subjective
assessment of one’s probability of winning the tournament. Using the guessed rank
for the compulsory tournament, I construct the measure for overconfidence, qi, by
subtracting the guessed rank from the actual rank, with the best rank being 4 and the
worst 1. This measure takes on integer values between -3 and 3, with positive (neg-
ative) values signifying overconfidence (underconfidence), and zero representing a
correct guess. The distribution of this variable is symmetric about zero, implying
that subjects in this study are on average correct about their rank, despite the fact
the guesses were not monetarily incentivized (see Appendix Figure A.1). Panel C
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in Figure 1 shows the distribution of overconfidence by ethnicity and gender. The
average value of the overconfidence variable for each ethnic group is statistically in-
distinguishable from zero, with no differences in distribution by gender detected in
Mann-Whitney tests for any ethnic group (all p-values>0.10). Both results are con-
trary to the typical findings of overconfidence, with males more overconfident than
females (e.g., Niederle & Vesterlund (2007); Balafoutas & Sutter (2010), Niederle
et al. (2008), Sutter & Rützler (2010), Healy & Pate (2011)).
The fact that the subjects in the current study are high school classmates and
grades are public knowledge in China may have contributed to the accuracy of their
guessed ranks in the experiment. Given that contestants in competitions with labor
market consequences, i.e., the types of competitions that motivated this research, of-
ten have an informed opinion of their relative abilities and chance of success (e.g.,
employees up for a promotion), the current lab setting may provide a closer approx-
imation to such competitions than lab settings where a high degree of anonymity
leads to less accurate assessments of relative ability.
Although overconfidence has significant explanatory power for tournament en-
try for the Han Chinese and the Yi, controlling for overconfidence in addition to
the probability of winning the tournament in Column 3 of Table 2 does not reduce
gender differences in tournament entry among the Yi, whereas the coefficient on
male for the Han Chinese is reduced to insignificance.
6.3 Risk aversion
Because payoffs are uncertain under the tournament payment scheme given per-
formance, the decision to enter the tournament could depend on one’s tolerance of
risk. I measure risk aversion using an ordered lottery selection instrument, where
each subject is asked to choose one lottery out of six, with the first lottery offering
a certain amount and all other alternatives offering higher expected payoff along
with higher variance. The size of the stakes was designed to be roughly compara-
ble to the stakes in the competition experiment. Each choice along with its corre-
sponding expected value, standard deviation, and implied CRRA coefficient range
is shown in Appendix Table A.1. This instrument was first developed for studying
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risk aversion in rural India (Binswanger, 1980), and is similar to the independently
developed instrument used in Eckel & Grossman (2008a).35 The main advantage
of this instrument is its simplicity, which has been shown to generate less noise
and more consistency over time, especially for subjects with low cognitive abil-
ity, as compared with finer but more complex risk instruments (Dave et al., 2010).
See Appendix B for a comparison of the risk aversion data with the results from
Binswanger (1980) and Eckel and Grossman (2008).
Panel D of Figure 1 shows the distribution of risk aversion by ethnicity and gen-
der. Casual observation indicates that in general, the female distributions are right-
skewed, whereas the male distributions are left-skewed, indicating that females are
more risk averse than males, as is consistent with the literature on gender differ-
ences in risk preferences (see, for example, Croson & Gneezy (2009), and Eckel
& Grossman (2008b)). Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the gender differences are
significant for all three ethnic groups (all p-values<0.05).
Because the risk instrument was presented separately from the competition ex-
periment, some subjects were not present for the risk measurement.36 In order to
explicitly address any selection effects this may cause, Column 4 of Table 2 re-
produces the specification in Column 3 but contains observations for only those
subjects for whom I observe risk aversion. The coefficients differ somewhat from
Column 3 to Column 4, indicating that some selection effects are present, although
none of the results are substantively affected.
Column 5 adds risk aversion, γi, as a control.37 The coefficient on gender for all
three ethnic groups remains virtually unchanged. Other studies in the literature have
also found risk aversion to either play no role in explaining tournament entry, or, if
it does play a significant role (as in Sutter & Rützler (2010)), to leave the significant
35The formatting for the instrument was adapted from Barr & Genicot (2008). See the web
appendix at ihome.ust.hk/~janezhang/.
36Due to time constraints imposed by the high schools, the risk instrument could not be admin-
istered in the same sessions as the competition experiment. Instead, in order to minimize wealth
effects from earnings in the experiment, the risk instrument was presented after the Chinese New
Year, where any earnings from the experiment are presumed to have been spent.
37γi is measured as the geometric mean of the implied CRRA coefficient range, following Bin-
swanger (1981).
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gender gap in tournament entry intact.38 See Niederle & Vesterlund (2011), section
2.2, for a survey of the literature on this point.
Following the literature, having included all three controls, I interpret any resid-
ual gender differences in tournament entry as gender differences in competitive in-
clination per se and use this measure in the subsequent examination of cultural
differences in preference for competition. There is no statistically significant gen-
der gap in competitive inclination for the Han Chinese, whereas for the Yi and the
Mosuo, there is a gender gap of greater than 20 percentage points, significant at
the 1% level. The existence of a gender gap for both the Yi and the Mosuo belies
important differences in levels of competitive inclination, which is discussed in the
next section.
7 Pooled Results
To formally test for cultural differences in competitive inclination gender gaps, this
section combines the data for the three ethnic groups and estimates a regression









β j+3ethn ji+δ pi+λqi+τγi+X ′iB+εi
(4)
where yi = 1 if the subject chooses tournament and 0 if the subject chooses
piece-rate. Measurements of pi, qi, and γi are described in Section 6. ethn1i, ethn2i,
and ethn3i are indicator variables for Han Chinese, Yi and Mosuo, respectively.
malei is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for males and 0 for females.
Xi represents a vector of background characteristics that include age, age squared,
number of brothers, number of sisters, education of the household head, and family
income. The coefficient of interest is β2(β3), which indicates the gender difference
among the Yi (Mosuo), as compared with the Han Chinese, the omitted group.
38Unfortunately, the magnitudes of the coefficients on risk aversion cannot be directly compared
across studies, since the measures of risk aversion differed across studies.
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Table 3 Column 1 reports the results from this estimation without background
controls. Consistent with the results in Table 2, the Han Chinese exhibit a small
and insignificant gender difference in competitive inclination while the Yi and the
Mosuo gender gaps are statistically significantly larger by 20 and 26 percentage
points, respectively. Controlling for demographics and socioeconomic status in
Column 3 leaves the result substantively unchanged.
Compared with the Han Chinese women, Yi women are statistically signifi-
cantly less competitively inclined by 20 percentage points while Mosuo women are
less competitively inclined by 6 percentage points, with the difference statistically
insignificant. These results roughly track the differences across the three ethnic
groups in female relative non-agricultural employment (see Table 1).
The coefficient of -0.2 on Yi implies that the difference in the gender gap com-
pared with the Han Chinese is entirely due to Yi women being less competitively
inclined than the Han Chinese women, with Yi men and Han Chinese men about
equally competitively inclined. In light of the cultural similarity between the Han
Chinese and the Yi prior to the radical communist gender egalitarian reforms from
which the Yi were largely exempted, the findings suggest the hypothesis that “fast-
moving” institutional changes can narrow the gender gap in competitive inclination.
The Mosuo, too, have a gender difference in competitive inclination that is sig-
nificantly larger than that of the Han Chinese. But because the Mosuo matrilineal
culture was different from the Han Chinese patrilineal culture prior to the reforms,
the comparison of the Han Chinese results with the Mosuo results does not speak
to the impact of institutional changes.
This is the first finding of a significant gender gap in competitive inclination
favoring males in a matrilineal society, and shows that matriliny is not sufficient
to reverse or eliminate the gender gap. One conjecture for the high Mosuo male
competitive inclination is that the non-exclusivity of Mosuo marriages increases
the return to competitive behavior for Mosuo males relative to males in monog-
amous societies, as is consistent with the Trivers theory.39 Of course, without a
proper comparison group, e.g., a matrilineal society similar to the Mosuo but is
39The Khasi of India and the Chewa of Malawi, the other two matrilineal societies for which we
have measures of competitive inclination, are monogamous (Gneezy et al., 2009; Flory et al., 2011).
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not polygamous, or a society that is similar to the Yi or to the Han Chinese but is
polygamous, it is impossible to test this conjecture in the context of this paper.40
8 Interpretation checks
As with any typical experimental study, the interpretation of the findings presumes
that subjects understood the experimental instructions. Although this is not di-
rectly observable, a useful check in this setting is to look at the coefficients on
the control variables in the empirical model. Referring to the third specification in
Table 3, a one percentage point increase in the probability of winning the tourna-
ment increases the probability of tournament entry by 0.8 percentage points. An
increase of one in the perceived rank compared with actual rank increases the prob-
ability of tournament entry by 9.4 percentage points. A one unit increase in the
CRRA coefficient decreases the likelihood of tournament entry by 3 percentage
points. These coefficients take the expected signs, have reasonable magnitudes,
and are jointly statistically significant (p-value<0.01), which suggests high-quality
decision-making on the part of the participants.
The second interpretation check tests whether competitive inclination measured
in the lab is merely proxying for general ability. Appendix Table A.3 reproduces
Table 3 but includes the subjects’ performance on standardized county-wide tests
as a control (variable name: grades). The results indicate that while grades is cor-
related with competitive inclination, the gender gap patterns we see across ethnic
groups remain substantively unchanged. The similarity in the estimates compared
to the estimates in Table 3 suggests that academic ability is largely orthogonal to
the other determinants of competitive inclination.
The third interpretation check directly tests whether government policies can
account for the gender difference in competitive inclination among the Yi. I exploit
the fact that exemptions from the marriage reform policies did not apply uniformly
to everyone in minority ethnic groups. In particular, for those who are salaried
40It is perhaps suggestive, though, that raw tournament entry rates for Mosuo males are almost
identical to that among male college students in the United States, whose courtship practice of dating
has also been characterized by some as polygamous (Fisman et al., 2006).
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employees of the state, non-compliance with the national marriage laws could result
in the loss of an enviable job. As a matter of measurement, since the private sector
is negligible in Ninglang, for all intents and purposes, the non-agricultural sector in
Ninglang represents the state sector.
Given that the marriage reforms discouraging child betrothals were successful
among the Yi cadres whereas they made little headway with the rest of the Yi, those
Yi women whose head of household works for the state are presumably less likely
to be engaged at a young age and more likely to marry at a later age than those Yi
women whose head of household works in agriculture. In so far as the ability to
pursue work outside of the home is hindered by early marriage, if anticipated labor
force participation influences female competitive inclination, the Yi women with
household heads in the agricultural sector would be expected to be less competi-
tively inclined than Yi women whose household heads work for the state. The Han
Chinese, being the majority ethnic group in China, were not given exemptions from
the national Marriage Law and therefore no differences in gender gap patterns are
expected across the two sectors for the Han Chinese.
To test these predictions, I interact gender with sector of work of the household
head for each ethnic group in the following probit regression:
yi = α0 +α1malei+α2sectori+α3sectori×malei+δ pi+λqi+ τγi+ εi (5)
where, as before, yi = 1 if the subject chooses tournament and 0 if the sub-
ject chooses piece-rate. malei is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for
males and 0 for females. sectori is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the house-
hold head works in the non-agricultural sector and 0 if the household head work in
the agricultural sector. pi, qiand γi are the controls for the probability of winning,
overconfidence, and risk aversion, respectively. α1, α2, and α3 are the coefficients
of interest. α1 indicates the gender difference in competitive inclination for those
whose families are in the agricultural sector; α2 indicates the difference in compet-
itive inclination for females who come from non-agricultural families compared to
those females from agricultural families; α3 indicates the difference in the gender
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gaps in competitive inclination between the two sectors.
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 4 in two panels, one for
the Han Chinese and one for the Yi. Columns 1, 2, and 3 in each panel explicitly
highlight any changes to the coefficients of interest that result from a reduced and
potentially selected sample of subjects who were observed for risk aversion. For all
three panels, it appears that the inclusion of risk aversion in column 3 has a negligi-
ble effect on the gender, sector, and gender-sector interaction terms. In comparison,
excluding the observations that could not be measured for risk aversion has a larger
effect on these coefficients, as seen in the difference in the coefficients of interest
between column 1 and column 2. Including additional controls for grades, educa-
tion of household head, and household income in columns 4 and 5 does not change
the coefficients of interest substantively, with the exception that the effect of com-
ing from a non-agricultural family on competitive inclination is now positive for
Han Chinese women, although this effect is insignificant across all specifications.
For these reasons, I refer to the first columns of each panel when evaluating model
predictions.
For the Yi, the entire gender difference in competitive inclination is driven by
those from agricultural families, where women are 40.5 percentage points less likely
to choose tournament, conditional on the probability of winning and on overconfi-
dence. There is no difference in male competitive inclination across the two sec-
tors, as predicted. For the Han Chinese, very little gender difference is observed for
those from agricultural families, and an insignificant increase in gender difference
is observed when moving from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector.
9 Alternative explanations
9.1 Selection
High school admissions is determined by a competitive standardized entrance exam.
No other academic criteria (e.g., grades, extracurriculars) are considered. A concern
is that differential selection into high school could potentially account for the pat-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of Table 1, the first row under the section “Selection into High School” shows male
to female sex ratios for children aged 8 and 9 in the county in 2000, who should be
in grades 11 and 12 in 2009. Compared to the US sex ratio of 1.04 for children un-
der 15, it appears that there is male preference among the Han Chinese and the Yi,
but not among the Mosuo. With regard to enrolling in high school, male and female
Han Chinese and Mosuo are equally likely to be in high school, conditional on be-
ing alive in the year 2000. Thus, selection into high school cannot explain the larger
gender difference in competitive inclination among the Mosuo compared to the Han
Chinese. In contrast, Yi females are much less likely to be in high school than Yi
males, even relative to their already smaller proportion in the population. Assuming
that the probability of enrolling in high school increases with competitive inclina-
tion, the Yi females in high school should be relatively more competitively inclined
than the Yi females in the population, compared to the Yi males. Therefore, the
Yi gender gap in competitive inclination found in high school underestimates the
population gender gap, and selection into high school does not explain the gender
difference in competitive inclination among the Yi compared to the Han Chinese.
9.2 One Child Policy
The well-known One Child Policy also exempted minorities to a large extent, so
an alternative interpretation of the results is that it is the experience of growing up
as an only child, rather than any cultural factors, that raised Han Chinese women’s
competitive inclination relative to minority women.41 However, the prevalence of
only children in the current study is uniformly low across all three ethnic groups
(see Table 1). For example, of the Han Chinese subjects, only 2 females (one non-
agricultural) and 1 male (non-agricultural) are only children. Such low rates of
only children cannot support the interpretation that the experience of growing up
as an only child contributed significantly to the patterns of competitive inclination
seen in the data.42 Family planning regulations, however, could have differentially
41For a discussion of the literature on growing up as an only child and its potential impact on
competitive inclination see Appendix C.
42The low prevalence of only children is consistent with the fact that prior to 1990, Ninglang
County fell into a category of regions that merely carried out education campaigns on the merits and
33
affected family size for the Han Chinese compared with the Yi.43 A one-sided t-test
indicates that the Han Chinese subjects have fewer siblings than the Yi subjects (p-
value = 0.09), but, as seen earlier, controlling for the number of siblings in Column
2 in Table 3 and Appendix Table A.3 did not affect the substantive results.
Another potential effect of the One Child Policy is ethnic differences in expected
fertility. Knowing that they will be raising fewer children in the future and have
more time to pursue a skilled vocation could increase the competitive inclination of
Han Chinese women compared to the Yi women. This is perhaps another channel
through which government policy leads to higher female competitive inclination
among the Han Chinese. The equality in competitive inclination between Mosuo
women and Han Chinese women is also consistent with this interpretation, given
the low fertility rates of the Mosuo.
9.3 Matriliny versus patriliny
Establishing property rights for women is considered by many to be instrumental to
women’s empowerment. In the Mosuo tradition, property is collectively owned and
inherited by all members of the family, whereas in the Han Chinese and Yi tradi-
tions, property is only inherited by males. Under the communist reforms, however,
land is not owned, but rather its usage is allocated on a per capita basis with deaths
and births resulting in reallocations administered by village government (Kung &
Liu, 1997). I am not aware of any exceptions to this policy for ethnic minorities.
To the extent there are not exceptions, property inheritance is unlikely to contribute
significantly to ethnic differences in the gender gap in competitive inclination.
Post-marital residence norms are also widely thought to impact parental invest-
ment in girls. A common saying in India, where patrilocality is prevalent, is that
investing in your daughter is akin to “watering you neighbor’s garden.” If lower
investment in girls causes lower competitive inclination, one might expect the Yi
methods of birth control, without setting birth quotas (China Family Planning Yearbook, 1986: 349;
Gazetteer of Ninglang Yi Autonomous County, 1993: 591). Only 0.33% of couples were certified as
parents of only children from 1980 to 1989 (Gazetteer of Ninglang Yi Autonomous County, 1993:
591).
43The Mosuo have had low fertility long before the regulations were introduced, the causes for
which has been the subject of a number of academic articles (e.g., Shih & Jenike (2002))
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women to be less competitively inclined given their tradition of patrilocality. But
since the subjects are all high school students, presumably the male and female sub-
jects have received comparable parental investment thus far, at least with regard to
education. It is possible, though, that the Yi female subjects have been shortchanged
in other forms of investment important for competitive inclination.
Matriliny may also play a role in explaining the higher competitive inclination
of the Mosuo women compared with the Yi women. However, given that Mosuo
society is similar to contemporary Han Chinese society in relative female labor
force participation in the non-agricultural sector and in low fertility, if matriliny
exerts an additional impact on competitive inclination, then one would expect an
appreciable difference in competitive inclination between the Mosuo women and
the Han Chinese women. In fact, there is not.
9.4 Discrimination
Labor market discrimination against minorities and women could lead to differ-
ences in competitive inclination across ethnicity-gender groups. It should be em-
phasized that in Ninglang county, the Yi are the predominant ethnic group, with
62% of the population, whereas the Han Chinese make up 20% of the population.
In fact, county government officials informed me that all the heads of the govern-
ment bureaus in the county are from the Yi ethnic group.
It is possible that the Yi discriminate against their own females in the skilled
labor market, but not against the Han Chinese males or females. It would seriously
challenge the interpretation of the results if the Han Chinese would also discrim-
inate against their females in areas where they are the majority group. In fact,
the proportion of Han Chinese female labor force employed in the non-agricultural
sector across China is 80% that of the male proportion (China Population Census,
2000, 0.095% micro sample). Furthermore, a recent study conducted in Beijing,
where the predominant ethic group is Han Chinese, found no statistically signifi-
cant gender difference in competitive inclination (Cameron et al., 2013).
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10 Conclusion
An emphasis in the women’s empowerment movement has been on expanding
women’s available choices, for example, in access to education and productive
work, and in the freedom to choose their marriage partners and to control their
fertility. If, however, internalized cultural messages can influence women to opt out
of competitions that can increase their productive capacity, even when they have the
same choices as men and are equally capable, then women may make suboptimal
choices for themselves, even when these choices are freely made.
The findings of this study affirm the Gneezy et al. (2009) conclusion that culture
matters for gender differences in competitive inclination, and show that it matters
in a setting where subjects from different cultural backgrounds are of the same age,
from the same small geographical area, have similar socioeconomic status, and
have advanced through the same schooling system to be now attending the same
high school.
This study is also the first to examine the impact of a large scale attempt at
cultural change on competitive inclination. The finding that two genetically simi-
lar cultures with traditionally patrilineal values, one exposed to communist gender
egalitarian reforms and one exempted, exhibit a large difference in the gender gap
in competitive inclination that is entirely attributable to those whose families are ex-
empt, suggests the hypothesis that institutional changes can narrow the gender gap
in competitive inclination. To the extent that competitive inclination is malleable,
policies that encourage women to enter labor market competitions will not only
have an impact on women’s labor market outcomes in the short-run, but may also
alter women’s attitude toward competition so that these encouragements become
unnecessary in the long-run.
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Appendix A History of settlement
The Mosuo came to settle in the Ninglang region around 700 A.D., having been
displaced from their home in the north as a result of wars between the Tibetan King-
dom and Tang China (Guo, 2008: 111-112). The first Han Chinese in the region
were soldiers of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) garrisons, stationed in the bor-
derlands to maintain regional security. During the Qing dynasty (1644-1912 A.D.),
Han merchants and craftsmen, as well as the Yi from the neighboring Greater Cool
Mountains of Sichuan province, migrated to Ninglang for work in the silver min-
ing industry (Guo, 2008: 71; Social and Historical Survey of the Yi of the Yunnan
Lesser Cool Mountains, 2009: 1-2). When the mines ceased their operations, the
migrants settled down to farm in the local communities (Guo, 2008: 29). Thus, the
three ethnic groups have had a long history of coexistence in the region prior to the
founding of the PRC. While there has been mutual cultural influence, for example,
in crop choice (Guo, 2008: 144-145), core ethnic distinctions persisted, so that the
nationwide ethnic identification project of the 1950s classified the Mosuo, the Yi,
and the Han Chinese as separate ethnic groups.44
Appendix B Risk aversion instrument
Appendix Table A.1 shows, for each gamble, the expected payout, the standard de-
viation of the payout, the implied range of CRRA coefficients, and the percentage
of participants who chose the gamble. The bottom panel of Appendix Table A.1
shows the same data from two other studies using similar instruments for compar-
ison. The distribution of choices in the current study appear most similar to the
Binswanger (1980) data using small stakes (Rs. 5 level). 9.9% (9.8%) of subjects
in the current study (in Binswanger (1980)) chose the two safest choices. 23.7%
44This is in part due to each group’s distinct language and history. See (Heberer, 1989: 31-34)
for a detailed discussion of the determinants of ethnic classification. Although ethnic consciousness
is undoubtedly more fluid than official categories would suggest, Stevan Harrell, an expert on the
Yi and other ethnic groups in Southwest China, argues that official categories have created at least
another identity with which groups differentiate themselves from one another (Harrell, 2001).
45
(23.9%) of subjects in the current study (in Binswanger (1980)) chose the two most
risky choices. Compared with Eckel and Grossman (2008), whose subjects are US
college students, the subjects in both the current study and in Binswanger (1980)
made more safe choices. One possible interpretation is that the populations in de-
veloping countries are more risk averse than the populations in developed countries.
However, a clean cross country comparison would need to fix the stake sizes, rela-
tive to purchasing power.
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Appendix C Table and Figures
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Figure A.2: Experimental Determinants of Tournament Entry by Ethnicity and Gen-
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Table A.7: Regressions of Tournament Entry on Gender, Ethnicity and Interactions,
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Figure A.3: Improvement in Score from Piece-Rate to Tournament Round across
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